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Abstract: I document a strong negative cross-country correlation between intergen-
erational earnings persistence and tax progressivity, and between intergenerational
earnings persistence and public expenditure on tertiary education. To explain these
correlations I then develop an intergenerational life-cycle model of human capital
accumulation and earnings, which features, progressive taxation, public education
expenditure, and borrowing constraints among the determinants of earnings persis-
tence. I calibrate the model to US data and use it to decompose the contributions
to earnings persistence from diﬀerent model elements and to quantify how earnings
persistence in the US changes as I introduce tax- and eduction expenditure policies
from other countries. I ﬁnd that individual investments in human capital accounts
for 62% of the estimated intergenerational earnings persistence in the US. Taxation,
through its impact on investments in human capital, can explain 25% of the diﬀer-
ence between the US and 10 other countries, whereas borrowing constraints have a
limited impact on earnings persistence.
Keywords: Intergenerational Earnings Persistence, Taxation, Public Education Ex-
penditure
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In recent years, several empirical studies have been concerned with estimating and
comparing the intergenerational persistence of earnings between fathers and sons
in Western economies. The main ﬁnding of this literature is that intergenerational
persistence is relatively high in the US, Britain, and Southern Europe, and relatively
low in Northern Europe and in Canada. Table 1 below displays the results from a
meta study of intergenerational earnings persistence across countries by Corak (2006)
3, supplemented with two recent studies from Italy and Spain4. The next question
follows naturally: What are the reasons for these diﬀerences? Western economies
diﬀer greatly with respect to public expenditure on education and with respect to tax
policies. Does the cross-country variation in public institutions explain the variation
in earnings persistence?
Understanding why earnings mobility diﬀers across countries is interesting, even
if only for positive reasons. However, the question of whether economic fate is prede-
termined or whether it is inﬂuenced by public institutions may also have important
policy implications. For instance, if the pattern we observe occurs because poor
parents in some countries are borrowing constrained and cannot invest optimally in
their children’s human capital, it may call for policy intervention.
Several explanations that could contribute to the observed cross-country pattern
in intergenerational earnings persistence have been proposed in the economic litera-
ture, but there is little quantitative work in the area. To the best of my knowledge
there are no previous papers studying the impact of cross-country diﬀerences in poli-
cies on earnings persistence. In this paper I start by documenting that there is a
strong negative cross-country correlation between earnings persistence and tax pro-
gressivity, and earnings persistence and public expenditure on tertiary education. I
3See also Blanden (2009) for an extensive summary of the empirical literature.
4There are many diﬃculties with comparing diﬀerent studies of earnings persistence; see Ap-
pendix 9.1 . Table 1 is to be interpreted as a stylized fact.
1Table 1: Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity Across Countries












This table displays the results from a meta study by Heinz Corak (2006).
*Taken from Piraino (2007). **Taken from Pla (2009). Pla estimates
one earnings elasticity using sons aged 30-40, and one earnings elasticity
using sons aged 40-50. The number listed is the average of the two.
then construct an intergenerational life-cycle model of human capital accumulation
and earnings to separate and quantify the determinants of earnings persistence. The
model contains key elements that have been proposed as determinants of earnings
persistence in the literature, namely, progressive taxation, the eﬃciency of human
capital investments, public education expenditure, borrowing constraints, partially
inheritable abilities, inter vivos transfers from parents to children, and idiosyncratic
wage shocks. I calibrate the model to US data and decompose the contributions of
the diﬀerent model elements. I ﬁnd that individual investments in human capital
and inheritable abilities/family endowments are about equally important drivers of
earnings persistence. Individual investments in human capital accounts for 62% of
the estimated intergenerational earnings elasticity in the US.
Next I study how earnings persistence in the US changes as I introduce policies
from other countries into the model. I ﬁrst use Denmark as an illustrating case-study
because it is the country in my sample with the highest and most progressive taxes
and the greatest expenditure on tertiary education, as well as the lowest earnings
persistence. I ﬁnd that taxation and public education expenditure have a signif-
2icant impact on earnings persistence and therefore are important contributors to
the cross-country patterns that empirical researchers have found. More government
expenditure on education and higher taxes reduce earnings persistence by reducing
parental/individual incentives for investing in human capital, which leads to a weaker
relationship between the parent’s ﬁnancial resources and the child’s earnings. In the
case of Denmark the impact of taxation is quantitatively greater than the impact of
education expenditure. Introducing a Danish tax system in the US reduces the inter-
generational elasticity of earnings from 0.47 to 0.35, or about 38% of the diﬀerence
between the US and Denmark.
Taxation on average explains 25% of the diﬀerence between the US and a sample
of 10 other countries, while education expenditure on average explains 35% of the
diﬀerence between the US and a sample of 7 other countries. I also study the quan-
titative importance of borrowing constraints in the model and conclude that they
have little impact on earnings persistence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Subsection 1.1 I discuss
some possible explanations for cross-country diﬀerences in intergenerational earnings
persistence in light of current theory and literature. In Section 2, I document a strong
correlation between earnings persistence and tax progressivity and between earnings
persistence and spending on tertiary education. Section 3 studies the impact of
taxation and public investment in education on earnings persistence in a simple
analytical model. Section 4 presents the quantitative model. In Subsection 4.1,
I discuss and justify some of the modeling choices. Section 5 discusses data and
calibration. Section 6 decomposes the contributions to earnings persistence from the
diﬀerent model elements. In Section 7 I study the impact on earnings persistence
from introducing Danish taxes and education expenditure into the US economy. I
also study the importance of borrowing constraints. Subsection 7.1 presents the
results from a multi-country analysis. Section 8 concludes.
31.1 Determinants of Intergenerational Earnings Persistence:
Theory and Recent Literature
In classical human capital theory, it is usually assumed that the earnings of individ-
uals depend on their level of human capital and on market luck, or random shocks.
Two factors go into human capital formation. One is a ﬁxed endowment, imperfectly
inherited by children from parents, and the other is investments in human capital,
which can be made both by the parents and by the government; see Becker and
Tomes (1979), Becker and Tomes (1986), and Solon (2004). Endowments here refer
to everything from genetically inherited ability to knowledge acquired from the par-
ents, family culture, and the parents’ social connections. In my model below I will
refer to the family endowment as ability. The narrowest deﬁnition of human capital
investment is investment in education, but many authors use broader deﬁnitions. It
is also commonly assumed that parents care about their children’s utility and that
utility depends only on the consumption of goods that cannot be considered as in-
vestments in human capital; see, for instance, Becker and Tomes (1986). This way,
the only reason to invest in children’s human capital is to increase their future con-
sumption through higher earnings. If there are diminishing returns to investment,
there will be an optimal level of investment for each child.
From this theory, several explanations for cross-country diﬀerences in earnings
persistence emerge. One possibility is that the inheritability of family endowments
is stronger in some countries. There could be many underlying reasons for this.
The degree of assortative mating does, for instance, diﬀer across countries. In some
countries, couples are more similar with respect to their education and family back-
ground, and since almost all research studies the correlation between fathers and
sons, this will cause the sons to be more similar to their fathers. Indeed, there seems
to be a somewhat higher correlation in spousal education in the US and Italy than
in Northern Europe, but Britain, which has relatively high earnings persistence, has
4a relatively low correlation in spousal education.5
Another possibility is that countries just diﬀer in the returns to investments in
human capital. In standard intergenerational models of earnings formation, earn-
ings persistence increases with the returns to human capital investments; see, for
instance, Restuccia and Urrutia (2004). Depending on modeling choices, there are
several channels through which this may work, but I will mention just a common
one: Optimal human capital investments are usually increasing in parental ﬁnancial
resources, as altruistic parents face a tradeoﬀ between their own consumption to-
day and their children’s future consumption. If human capital investments become
more eﬃcient, then for a given inequality of investments in children of high and low
earners, the inequality of earnings outcomes will increase. This results in higher in-
tergenerational earnings persistence. In Section 3 below, I illustrate this mechanism
with a simple model.
Tax codes are also plausible explanations for the cross-country diﬀerences in
earnings persistence, as they aﬀect the incentives to invest in human capital. If taxes
are progressive, it will have the eﬀect that human capital investments become less
attractive, particularly for someone with high ability. This will shrink the dispersion
of human capital investments and cause smaller earnings persistence. In Section 2, I
document a negative correlation between tax progressivity and earnings persistence.
If there are diminishing returns to human capital investments, and investments
made by parents and the government are substitutes, then a parent’s incentive to
invest will be falling as the government invests more. As the government invests
more, the diﬀerence between how much is invested in rich and poor children becomes
smaller and earnings persistence will fall. Western economies diﬀer with respect to
public education expenditure. As I document in Section 2, the countries with low
earnings persistence tend to spend more on public investments in education relative
5See Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2005)
5to GDP per capita. The diﬀerence is particularly large when it comes to spending
on tertiary education.
Finally, one potential cause of earnings persistence that has received much at-
tention in the literature is the presence of credit constraints. As mentioned above,
there will usually be a direct relationship between parents’ and children’s earnings.
This will be true even if the parents are not credit-constrained with respect to their
own resources, and if human capital investments are risky it may also be true even
if they are not credit constrained with respect to their children’s future earnings. A
stronger relationship may, however, occur if low earners with high ability/endowment
children face binding credit-constraints with respect to investing in their children’s
human capital. One potential source of cross-country diﬀerences in earnings persis-
tence is the degree of credit market completeness. I do not have any good measure
of credit market completeness across countries, but if the government heavily sub-
sidizes education, it should reduce the number of credit-constrained parents. In my
structural model below, I do, however, ﬁnd that increasing or decreasing borrowing
limits has very little quantitative impact on earnings persistence in the US.
Empirical Literature
The most commonly used measure of earnings persistence is the coeﬃcient, often
denoted β, from the regression of the logarithm of the son’s earnings on the logarithm
of the father’s earnings and a constant, also called the intergenerational elasticity of
earnings:
log(yson) = α + β log(yfather) + ￿ (1)
The relevant measure of earnings is lifetime or permanent earnings, but as this mea-
sure is rarely available, the best a researcher can do is often to average several years
of earnings and control for the age at which the earnings were observed. What β tells
us, in a purely statistical sense, is what percentage of a father’s earnings advantage,
6relative to the mean in his generation, that is on average transferred to the son. A β
of 0 would represent the case in which the earnings of fathers and sons are completely
unrelated, while a β of 1 would represent the case in which the earnings advantage of
the father is perfectly transferred to the son. Hypothetically, one can also imagine β
smaller than 0 or greater than 1. In practice, however, empirical studies have found
β between 0 and 1, which implies that earnings tend to revert to the mean over
generations.
The statistical literature, which estimates and compares the intergenerational
elasticity of earnings for diﬀerent countries, is by now quite large. Blanden (2009)
provides a thorough discussion. There are some diﬃculties related to methodology
and data, which makes it harder to compare diﬀerent studies (see Appendix 9.1). It is,
however, clear that there are substantial diﬀerences between countries. Corak (2006)
provides a meta study based on previous empirical studies of earnings persistence in
diﬀerent countries and current knowledge of data and methodological issues. Table 1
reproduces the main ﬁndings of his study, supplemented with two recent studies from
Italy and Spain. It documents the pattern with relatively high earnings persistence
in the US, Britain, and Southern Europe, and relatively low earnings persistence in
Northern Europe and in Canada.
Quantitative Literature
In addition to the empirical work, there is also a theoretical literature, pioneered by
Becker and Tomes, which gives us a framework for understanding the factors that may
aﬀect the correlation of children’s and parents’ earnings. The quantitative/structural
literature, which takes models to the data, is, however, very sparse. I will brieﬂy
mention the two papers that are closest in spirit to the work I am undertaking.
Han and Mulligan (2001) develop a very simple two-period/two-generation model
in which parents care about their children and have the opportunity to invest in their
human capital and to give them monetary bequests. They calibrate their model to
7ﬁt characteristics of the US economy, including the intergenerational elasticity of
earnings, β, which they take to be 0.4. They then study how β changes as they
eliminate intergenerational borrowing constraints and increase the variance of shocks
to ability. The authors conclude that eliminating borrowing constraints reduces β
by at most 0.1, but they also ﬁnd that β increases as the heterogeneity of family
endowments increases. They suggest that if there is a greater variance of family
endowments in the US and Britain, perhaps because those countries are more racially
and culturally diverse, then this result could be used to explain higher earnings
persistence in those countries6
It should be noted that in Han and Mulligan (2001) agents experience the same
shocks to human capital and ﬁnancial assets. It is therefore no insurance in holding
both assets. An individual will invest in human capital until the return equals
the return on ﬁnancial assets, and if needed borrow ﬁnancial assets to achieve this
level of human capital investment. This may increase the importance of borrowing
constraints.
Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) develop a model with inﬁnite dynasties in which
agents live for four periods: two as children and two as adults. Parents decide
how much to invest in their children’s elementary education and whether to send
them to college. There is also a government that imposes taxes, runs a balanced
budget, and invests the tax revenues in education. The focus of the paper is to
determine whether investments in early or college education are quantitatively more
important for earnings persistence. They ﬁnd that early education matters more
and that government investments in early education have a greater impact than
government investments in college education. My results in Section 7.1 are consistent
6The ﬁnding that a larger variance of family endowments leading to larger and not smaller
persistence is not obvious. In the model in Section 4 this typically happens if the persistence of
family endowments is greater than the persistence of earnings. However, in the calibrated model
the persistence of family endowments is smaller than the persistence of earnings, and increasing the
variance of family endowments leads to lower earnings persistence.
8with the ﬁnding that an increase in government spending on early education has
greater impact on earnings persistence than an equally large increase in government
spending on tertiary education.
My paper is the ﬁrst to study the quantitative impact of cross-country diﬀerences
in policies on β. It also oﬀers a richer, more realistic model, combining some elements
that are present in each of the two papers above. In Section 4.1, I discuss the
diﬀerent model elements in detail and why they are important in a study of earnings
persistence.
2 Stylized Facts
It is diﬃcult to summarize the tax system in a country with just one number. A
commonly used measure of tax progressivity is so-called progressivity wedges; see,
for instance, Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009):




This measure says something about how fast the tax rate increases as earnings in-
crease from y1 to y2. If there is a ﬂat tax, then the progressivity wedge would be zero
for all levels of y1 and y2. For each country in Table 1, I use labor income tax data
from the OECD tax database to ﬁt a tax function; see Appendix 9.2 for a detailed
description. I then construct progressivity wedges using the average tax rate. I use
the average earnings, AE, in each country for y1 and four times average earnings for
y2. In Figure 1, I plot earnings persistence on the y-axis against this measure of tax
progressivity on the x-axis. The correlation between the two quantities is -0.81 and
the regression coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant when earnings persistence is regressed
on the progressivity wedges. A strong correlation between two variables need not
imply, of course, that one has a causal eﬀect on the other. However, this empirical
9Figure 1: Correlation Between Tax Progressivity and Earnings Persistence
Earnings persistence from Table 1. The tax data is an average of the years 2001-2005,
taken from the OECD Tax and Beneﬁt Calculator and the OECD Tax Database. The
regression coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Figure 2: Correlation Between Public Expenditure on Tertiary Education and Earn-
ings Persistence
Earnings persistence from Table 1. The education spending data are an average of
the years 1999-2005, taken from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. The regression
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
10observation motivates a further investigation of the impact of taxes on earnings per-
sistence in a structural model with careful modeling of the tax systems. In Figure 2,
I plot the correlation between earnings persistence and public expenditure per stu-
dent in tertiary education as a fraction of GDP per capita. The correlation between
the two variables is -0.84, and the regression coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant when
earnings persistence is regressed on education expenditure.
3 A Simple Model
To obtain an intuitive understanding of how taxation and public education expen-
diture qualitatively aﬀect earnings persistence, it is helpful to start with a simple
model. The model is a slight modiﬁcation of Solon (2004), where I have changed
the wage function and the process for inheritance of abilities to be similar to the
wage function and the process for inheritance of abilities in the quantitative model
of Section 4.
Assume that there is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived single individual dynasties.
Each individual lives for two periods: one as a child and one as an adult. Parents
decide how much to consume and how much to invest in their children’s human
capital, while children do not make any economic decisions. A parent’s utility is a
function of today’s consumption, ct, and his child’s future earnings, yt+1:
Ut(ct,yt+1) = log(ct) + αlog(yt+1) (3)
The parameter α measures how altruistic parents are with respect to their children.
The earnings of the child are determined by his level of human capital. Human
capital is a function of investments made by the parents, It, investments made by
11the government, Ig, and of the child’s ability or family endowment, At:
yt+1 = γht+1 (4)
ht+1 = At+1(It + Ig)
ψ (5)
Abilities are imperfectly transmitted from parent to child. I assume them to be
log-normally distributed, and follow an AR(1)-process:
log(At+1) = θlog(At) + ν, ν ∼ N(0,σ
2
ν) (6)
Assuming that labor income is taxed at rate τ, the utility maximization problem of




s.t. : ct + It = yt(1 − τ)
yt+1 = γAt+1(It + Ig)
ψ (7)
Substituting for ct, and yt+1, gives a maximization problem in It:
max
0≤It<yt
log(yt(1 − τ) − It) + αψlog(It + Ig) + αlog(At+1) + αlog(γ) (8)
The ﬁrst-order condition is:
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= 0, if It > 0 (9)
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As long as there is an interior solution, It is decreasing in the tax rate, τ, decreasing in
government investment, Ig, increasing with the altruism parameter, α, and increasing
in the human capital production function parameter, ψ. Substituting for It in 5 and
taking the log of 4, we get an equation relating the log of the earnings of children to












, if yt >
Ig
αψ(1−τ)






















Proof: See Appendix 9.3
Proposition 3.1 states that as long as both the parental investment and the gov-
ernment investment are positive, the impact of the parent’s earnings on the child’s
earnings become smaller when there is a higher tax level or more government in-
vestment, or when human capital production is more eﬃcient. In the case of the
tax, this happens because a smaller share of the parent’s earnings can be devoted to
investing in human capital when the tax is higher. Government investment, which
is equal for all children, then accounts for a larger share of the total human capi-
13tal investment, and a given percentage change, or a change in the log, of parental
earnings will have a smaller impact on the log of the child’s earnings. However, if
government investments were zero, then the ﬂat tax could be separated out as a con-
stant term. When government investment increases, it has the same eﬀect as when
the tax increases. The relative importance of parental earnings is decreasing when Ig
increases. The impact of parental earnings on the child’s earnings is increasing in the
human capital production function parameter, ψ. This is simply because an increase
in ψ increases the eﬀect of parental investments. The equation usually estimated by
empirical researchers studying intergenerational earnings persistence is:
log(yit+1) = α + β log(yit) + ￿it+1 (13)
where i denotes the family or dynasty. If we assume that the government in-
vests a constant fraction of average earnings in education, Ig = ˜ Ig¯ y, and that
yit >
Ig
αψ(1−τ) ∀ i, which implies that all parents invest a positive amount in their
child’s human capital, we only have to consider the ﬁrst part of equation 11. Let us
also assume that the economy is in steady state; i.e., the cross-sectional distributions
of log(yit+1) and log(yit) are identical. With the purpose of obtaining an analyti-
cal solution for the regression coeﬃcient, β, we can log-linearize the ﬁrst part of 11




(1 − τ) + ˜ Ig
log(yit) + log(Ait+1)7 (14)
Equation 14 now resembles the classical linear regression equation in 13, except that
the error term, log(Ait+1), is correlated with the explanatory variable, log(yit). This
is because both log(Ait+1) and log(yit) depend on log(Ait). OLS estimates of the
slope will therefore be biased. Equation 14 is a ﬁrst-order autoregression where the
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14error term follows the AR(1)-process as in 6. It is shown in Greene (2000), pp.








the probability limit of the
OLS-estimator for the slope coeﬃcient in this equation is given by the sum of the
true slope coeﬃcient and the autoregressive parameter of the error term divided by
one plus their product. Using this result we get that in the population regression
where 14 is estimated by OLS:
β =
(ψ + θ)(1 − τ) + θ˜ Ig















Proof: See Appendix 9.3
Thus, in this simple model, we have seen that an increase in the level of taxes
and/or government investment in education reduces earnings persistence by reducing
the direct impact of parental earnings on the child’s earnings (Proposition 3.1). The
intuition behind the result is that the relative importance of parental investments
compared to government investments decreases. The diﬀerence between how much is
invested in rich and poor children becomes smaller in percent/log terms as taxes or
government investments increase, and this leads to a fall in earnings persistence. β
is, not surprisingly, increasing in the correlation of parent’s and child’s ability, θ. It
is also increasing in the human capital production function parameter, ψ. It should
be noted that the relationship between the market return to human capital, γ, and
β generally is sensitive to the speciﬁcation of the wage function. I have speciﬁed a
constant return to a unit of human capital, and γ does not enter the expression for
β. In Solon’s original model, an exponential return to human capital was speciﬁed
and γ would then be present in the expression for β.
15As long as the tax is ﬂat in this model, there is a linear relationship between hu-
man capital investments and parental earnings. The percentage variation of private
investments is the same when all parents invest a positive amount and the tax level
increases; however, the percentage variation in total investments decreases because
private investments are smaller compared to public investments. Introducing a pro-
gressive tax may have had the eﬀect of decreasing the percentage variation in private
investments, and this would also reduce earnings persistence. We will now turn to
the study of a more realistic model with the purpose of quantifying the determinants
of earnings persistence.
4 The Quantitative Model
Economic Environment
The economy is populated by single-individual dynasties, where each individual lives
for at least 70 years and at most 100 years. A model period is ﬁve years. For the ﬁrst
four periods, or 20 years, of his life, an individual is part of the parent’s household
and does not make any economic decisions. At age 20, a young individual moves
out of his parent’s house and forms his own household. At age 30, he has a child,
and at age 65 he retires. The ﬁrst decision a young adult must make is whether
or not to enroll in college. All working age households, including college students,
decide how much to work, consume, and save at a risk-free rate. College students
also decide how much to invest in human capital production. There is a ﬁxed time
cost of attending college, and college students have to work at a low ﬁxed wage,
which is independent of their human capital. There is a probability of failing college,
depending on the student’s ability and prior level of human capital. Households are
altruistic and care about their children’s utility. Households with a child, ages 5 to
19, decide how much to invest in the child’s human capital. At the moment a child
16Figure 3: Household’s Life Cycle
leaves home and begins his own household, the parent has the option of giving him
a one-time gift of liquid assets to ensure that he gets a good start in life. This is, of
course, a simplifying assumption, but it greatly reduces the complexity of the model.
Empirically, the fact that the child receives a one-time gift at the beginning of his
adult life can be motivated by the observation that many parents help their child
with paying for college or with buying a ﬁrst home. Figure 3 illustrates the life cycle
of a household.
Wages and Human Capital
Worker productivity in this economy depends on human capital, college completion,
labor market experience, and labor market luck. Since there is no unemployment in
the model, experience is equal to potential experience and is fully determined by age
and whether a person attended college. Letting x denote the individual’s experience












17Where u is an idiosyncratic productivity shock, and j ∈ {0,1} is an indicator for
whether the individual is college educated. There are diﬀerent age/experience paths
for the wages of college- and high-school-educated workers. The human capital of a
person must be built up during his childhood and during college. How much human
capital a person accumulates depends on his ability, A, and how much is invested in
his human capital in each time period by the parents, Ip, by the individual himself
in college, Is, and by the government, Ig:
h









Here h0 denotes human capital in the next time period. I follow the tradition in the
literature on intergenerational earnings persistence (see Becker and Tomes (1979),
Becker and Tomes (1986), and Solon (2004)) and think of human capital investments
as investments of money or goods. However, while many deﬁnitions of what should
be considered human capital investments have been suggested, I will think of it as
investment in education. The ability or family endowment of the child is broadly
deﬁned to include things that do not have to be bought, like genetics, family culture,
motivation, and knowledge acquired from the parents. Abilities are assumed to be
log-normally distributed and imperfectly inherited from parent to child according to
an AR(1) process:
log(Ac) = θlog(Ap) + ν, ν ∼ N(0,σ
2
ν) (20)
19 is the same functional form as in Ben-Porath (1967), except that Ben-Porath
allowed for diﬀerent exponentials on the human capital and goods inputs. The same
production function has been used in some recent studies involving human capital
accumulation; see, for instance, Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2007), or Ionescu
18(2009). These studies do, however, ignore the input of goods in the production
of human capital and focus on the human capital input, which is modeled as the
product of previous human capital and time. They are also diﬀerent in that they
focus on human capital accumulation during work-life and/or college. In my model
the input of time is kept constant, and human capital accumulation starts at age 5.
It is known that the eﬃciency of human capital investments varies by age (see Cunha
and Heckman (2007)), and this is the rationale for specifying diﬀerent technologies
before college and in college. One could have used a diﬀerent technology at every
age but this would complicate the model.
Preferences
The momentary utility is a function of consumption in adult equivalents, c
e(t), where












A household discounts the future by a factor, δ. When the child leaves home, the
parent cares about the child’s utility, Uc, but discounts it by, α. Thus a household’s








Borrowing for College and Probability of College Completion
Individuals who attend college are allowed to borrow up to an amount, z, while in
college. I require that they do not retire in debt, and in subsequent periods, I let the
borrowing constraint, φ(j,t), be linearly decreasing between college and retirement.
High school graduates are not allowed to borrow:




, φ(j = 0,t) = 0 (23)
19However, if someone took out a loan for college and failed to complete college, they
will also be subject to the borrowing constraint for college graduates. The probability
of success in college, π(Ah), is a function of ability and acquired pre-college human
capital:
π(Ah) = 1 − e
ΩAh (24)
Recursive Formulation of the Household’s Problem
A household can be in ﬁve diﬀerent life stages, and therefore, there are ﬁve diﬀerent
household maximization problems. The ﬁrst decision a young household must make
is whether or not to go to college. This is done at age 20, or t = 1. In both cases he
decides how much to consume, c, next period’s capital, k0, and how much to work,
n. If he goes to college, he must also decide how much to invest in human capital,
Is. The state variables are age, t, capital, k, his level of human capital, h, his ability,
A, and the productivity shock, u. In all time periods, experience, x, will be equal to
the current model period minus 4 for high-school-educated workers and equal to the
current model period minus 5 for college-educated workers. Formally, the individual
solves the following Bellman problem:
W(k,h,t = 1,A,u) = max{V (j = 0,·),V (j = 1,·)}, where:
V (0,k,h,t,A,u) = max
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20s.t.: c(1 + τc) + k


















3x3+u, u ∼ N(0,σ
2
u)
Is ≥ 0, c > 0, w = wc, k
0 ≥ φ(1,1), 0 ≤ n ≤ 1 − $, t
0 = t + 1 (25)
$ is here the time cost of attending college, τc is a ﬂat consumption tax, and τ(wn)
is a non-linear labor income tax rate. Also note that while in college, an individual
must work at the ﬁxed wage, wc, which is independent of his level of human capital.
The problem of a working household without a child and at age 30 when no human
capital investments are made is:
V (j,k,h,t,A,u) = max









s.t. : c(1 + τc) + k





0 ≥ φ(j,t), 0 ≤ n ≤ 1, c > 0, t
0 = t + 1, for t = 2,3,8,9 (age = 25,30,55,60)
At age 30, (20) is also a constraint, as the ability of the child will be revealed in the
next period, and the parent must have an expectation of his child’s ability. Between
ages 35 and 50 the parent must also decide on how much to invest in the child’s
human capital. He solves:
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0 ≤ n ≤ 1, c > 0, t
0 = t + 1, for 4 ≤ t ≤ 6 (35 ≤ age ≤ 50) (27)
21hp here denotes the human capital of the parent, and hc denotes the human capital
of the child. The parent must keep track of both as state variables. A is now the
ability of the child. There is no reason for the parent to know his own ability after
the child’s ability is revealed. When the parent is age 50 and the child is age 20, the
child leaves the household and the parent has a one-time opportunity to give him a
gift or an inter vivos transfer, b. The parent’s problem is:
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0 ≥ φ(j,t), c > 0, 0 ≤ n ≤ 1, b ≥ 0, t
0 = t + 1 (28)
α here controls the parent’s degree of altruism. I assume that the parent does not
observe the child’s idiosyncratic shock before the size of the gift is decided. He
must, therefore, take the expectation of the child’s value function with respect to the
idiosyncratic shock. A household in retirement simply solves:
V (j,k,h,t,A,u) = max
c>0,k0≥0







s.t. : c(1 + τc) + k
0 = k(1 + r) + T
for 10 ≤ t ≤ 16 (65 ≤ age ≤ 95) (29)
T here is a constant amount of social security, and Γ(t) is an age-dependent proba-
bility of survival to the next period.
4.1 Discussion of Modeling Choices
Life-Cycle Model with College Decision
Using a life-cycle model with college decision allows us to study government expen-
22diture on diﬀerent levels of education. We can separate the eﬀects of spending on
primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Another argument for using a life-cycle
model is that when studying the impact of parents’ earnings on the earnings of chil-
dren, we are interested in the ﬁnancial resources available to parents at the time
when there are children in the household. There is a literature documenting that
even after controlling for parents’ lifetime income, the income of the parents dur-
ing the childhood years matters for the children’s income; see Cunha and Heckman
(2007) for a survey.
Financial Assets, Inter Vivos Transfers, and Human Capital
I will argue that in a realistic quantitative model developed to study intergenerational
earnings persistence, it is important to have ﬁnancial assets and a mechanism for
transfers from parent to child, in addition to human capital. The presence of assets
in the model aﬀects how much is invested in a child’s human capital in various ways.
In a model without ﬁnancial assets, parents will divide their resources between their
own consumption today and their children’s future consumption or, equivalently,
their children’s human capital. This may create a too strong correlation between the
earnings of the parent and the child’s human capital, as the optimal investment in
the child will always be increasing in the earnings of the parent. If there are ﬁnancial
assets and diminishing returns to human capital investments, there will be a point
at which the return on capital is strictly higher than the return on human capital,
and this will put a cap on human capital investments.
Children with low ability but rich parents will earn more in a world with no ﬁ-
nancial assets, because the only way to help them is to invest in their human capital.
With assets in the model, their parents will rather give them some ﬁnancial assets.
Furthermore, since there is uncertainty in the model, parents would like to accumu-
late some assets to insure against negative shocks, even when the expected return
on human capital investments is higher than the return on ﬁnancial assets. This will
23take resources away from human capital investments. Finally, a popular explana-
tion both for earnings persistence (see, for instance, Han and Mulligan (2001)), and
for college enrollment in the literature is the existence of borrowing constraints. To
study the impact of borrowing constraints, it is crucial that the model have ﬁnancial
assets.
Labor Supply
Allowing agents in the model to choose their work hours aﬀects the returns to human
capital investments and will be important for the shape of the optimal investment
policy as a function of capital. In Figure 4, I illustrate this point by plotting the
optimal investment in human capital for an individual in college. As can be seen
from the ﬁgure, the optimal investment peaks at some point and starts sloping down-
wards. This is because, as the agent becomes wealthier, he will enjoy more leisure
in the future and the returns to investing in human capital are falling. Some fam-
ilies accumulate a lot of physical capital, but the fact that they enjoy leisure and
can control their labor supply will aﬀect the shape of their optimal human capital
investments.
Labor supply is also potentially important for college enrollment and for the
importance of borrowing constraints with respect to human capital investments; see
Garriga and Keightley (2007), and Keane and Wolpin (2001). If a poor person
cannot borrow to invest in his child, he may choose to compensate by working a
bit more. Equivalently, if a college student cannot borrow, he may choose to take a
part-time job. Having labor choice in the model reduces the importance of borrowing
constraints. If a college student has no other way of raising money than borrowing,
then borrowing constraints are more likely to be important.
24Figure 4: Human Capital Investment for a Model College Student
5 Calibration
Many of the parameters can be obtained without solving the model. I calibrate 27
model parameters to their empirical counterparts. The remaining 11 parameters are
estimated jointly using an exactly identiﬁed simulated method of moments approach.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the parameters calibrated outside and inside the model.
The main source of data for the estimated parameters, 6 out of the 11 data moments,
is employed males from the PSID (1999-2005). I use employed males because most of
the literature on intergenerational earnings persistence is based on the relationship
between father and son, and the analysis is carried out on working individuals. In
addition there is no unemployment in my model. I use the years 1999-2005 because
these are the years for which I also have data on education spending and taxes.
Below I describe the data used in the calibration of each parameter as well as the
estimation approach.
25Table 2: Parameters Calibrated Outside of the Model
Parameter Value Description Target
r 0.011 Risk free interest rate (annual) 3-mnth T-bill minus inﬂation (1947-2008)







1+η Browning et al. (1999)
η 3
e 1.0 or 1.3 OECD-modiﬁed equivalence scale.
γ0

















τ1 -0.573 τ(wn) = τ1(wn/AE)





τc 0.084 Consumption tax Vertex Inc. (2002)
$ 0.110 Time spent studying in college American Time Use Survey
wc $11.14/h Wage rate in college CPS (1999-2005)
Ig(t) Primary: $4522 Public spending per student UNESCO (1999-2005)
Secondary: $5295
Tertiary: $10672
z $24856 College borrowing limit Lochner and Monge-Narajano (2008)
T $13094 Old age Social Security Social Security Administration (1999-2005)
Γ(t) Varies Death probabilities NCHS (1991-2001)
Dollar amounts in annual 2005 dollars.
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6Preferences
The momentary utility function is the standard CRRA utility function in 21, with





. I use the so-called ¨ OECD-
modiﬁed¨ adult equivalence scale and set e(t) = 1.3 when there is a child in the
household, and e(t) = 1.0 when there is not. Consistent with a survey of the em-
pirical literature in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999), I set the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion, σ, equal to 2, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, η, equal to 3. The elasticity of substitution between consumption and labor,
χ, the time discount factor, δ, and the altruism parameter, α, are among the esti-
mated parameters. The corresponding data moments are average hours worked for
employed males 25-64, asset holdings of employed males 50-54, and asset holdings of
employed males 25-29 in the PSID (1999-2005). Consistent with the American Time
Use Survey (2003), I assume that the day has 15 hours not needed for personal care
and normalize hours so that working 15 hours per day is equivalent to a labor supply
of 1 in the model.
Risk-Free Interest Rate
Given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, I take the risk-free rate as ﬁxed
and calibrate it using data. I set the risk-free rate equal to the average of 3-month
T-bill rates minus inﬂation over the period 1947-2008 based on data from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.8
Wages
I calibrate the life-cycle proﬁle of wages exogenously, using the entire PSID from
1968-2005. I regress wages on model potential experience and control for the year
of observation. I estimate diﬀerent experience paths for college graduates and non-
college graduates. For the data moments used in the structural estimation, I use
only the years 1999-2005. I take the average wage of college graduates, the average
8Series TB3MS and GDPDEF
27wage of high school graduates, and the variance of log wages as the corresponding
data moments to estimate the following parameters: the market return to human
capital, γ0, the starting level of human capital, h0, and the standard deviation of the
idiosyncratic earnings shock, σu. In the PSID, individuals are observed only every
second year from 1999-2005, while they are observed every year until 1997. To get
an estimate of the variance of ﬁve-year wages in the time period from 1999-2005, I
assume that the ratio between the variance of ﬁve-year and one-year wages in this
time period is the same as it was in the period 1991-1997.
Production of Human Capital/Investment in Education
The corresponding data moments to the parameters of the human capital production
function, ψ0, and ψ1, are private spending on elementary and college education. In
addition I must know public spending per student at each level of education, Ig(t).
I follow Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and think of education spending by local
governments in primary and secondary education as private spending, while I take
state and federal education spending as public spending. The rationale behind this
is that local government spending is ﬁnanced by local taxes and that parents, when
they choose which neighborhood to live in, choose the level of local government
education spending. Public schools receive both local and state/federal funding, and
schools in wealthier neighborhoods have larger budgets due to more local funding; see
also Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1998). In one way,
counting all local government spending as parental investment in education may be
a strong assumption that leads to a high level of private education spending relative
to public spending. On the other hand, deﬁning education spending as the only form
of monetary investment that parents make in human capital is very conservative. To
construct the relevant calibration targets for each level of education under the above
assumption, I use data on public expenditure per student as fraction of GDP per
capita from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (1999-2005), and data on private
28Table 3: Parameters Estimated Endogenously
Parameter Value Description Data Moment






3x3+u ¯ w, skilled workers
h0 0.467 Starting level of human capital ¯ w, unskilled workers
ψ0 0.300 h0 = h + A
￿
hI)
ψ0, before college ¯ Ip, elementary school
ψ1 0.881 h0 = h + A
￿
hI)
ψ1, in college ¯ Is, in college
σu 0.398 u ∼ N(0,σ2
ν) Std. dev. of log(w)
θ 0.332 log(Ac) = θlog(Ap) + ν β
σv 0.259 ν ∼ N(0,σ2
ν) College enrollment
Ω -0.427 pi(Ah) = 1 − eΩAh College failure rate
α 0.302 Parental altruism ¯ k, age 25-29







δ 1.016 Discount factor ¯ k, age 50-54
expenditure as a fraction of total expendiure, as well as local government’s share of
public expenditure from the OECD (1999-2005).
Intergenerational Correlation of Ability
The intergenerational correlation of ability, θ, obviously has an impact on the inter-
generational persistence of earnings, and I use that as the calibration target for this
parameter. I obtain the value of 0.47 for the intergenerational earnings persistence
from a meta study by Corak (2006). This also happens to be the same value as found
by Grawe (2004), the latest study, using data from the PSID.
Time Spent Studying in College, College Enrolment, Failure, and Borrowing
To calibrate the ﬁxed time cost of attending college, $, I use data from the American
Time Use Survey (2004-2008). College students spend, on average, 3.3 hours per
day on educational activities on weekdays. I assume that they attend two 13-week
semesters per year and that they also study 3.3 hours per day on weekends. While
this may be a bit optimistsic, many students also attend summer school. I use
college enrollment as the data target for the standard deviation of abilities, σν, and
the college failure rate as the target for the parameter Ω, which determines the
probability of failing college. I compute these targets from the fraction of males with
29college degrees in the PSID (1999-2005), and data on college survival probability
from the OECD (2000, 2004). I get the college borrowing limit from Lochner and
Monge-Narajano (2008). This is the borrowing limit for the federal loan program
called Staﬀord loans, which is what most students are eligible for. There is another
loan program called Perkins loans, which can provide further loans to the students
with greatest ﬁnancial need, but in practice, few students make use of this program.
Below I study the eﬀect of relaxing the borrowing constraint.
Taxes
The labor income tax schedule is a polynomial function of an individual’s earnings


















As described in more detail in Appendix 9.2 I ﬁt this polynomial to labor income tax
data from the OECD tax database (2001-2005). These data are constructed by the
OECD based on tax laws from diﬀerent countries. It is well suited for cross-country
comparisons; see also Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009). Coming up with an
accurate estimate of consumption taxes in the US is complicated by the fact that
there are local county-level taxes in addition to state taxes. Vertex Inc. (a consulting
company) estimated that the average consumption tax in the US was 8.4% in 2002.
I use that number. For simplicity, I abstract from capital taxes. I do this because
diﬀerent types of capital are taxed diﬀerently, and this also diﬀers across countries.
Households do, for instance, have about half of their wealth in their homes, wealth
that may or may not be taxed. In the US, interest income is taxed as labor income,
while dividends and capital gains are subject to capital gains tax. The return on
capital is, however, set very conservatively in the calibration. It is set equal to the
return on risk-free bonds, which was 1.1% over the past 60 years.
30Table 4: Estimation Statistics
Statistic Data Model
Mean hours worked 0.417 0.417
Mean wages of workers without college degrees 1.000 1.002
Mean wages of workers with college degrees 1.757 1.757
Std. dev. of log(wage) 0.570 0.571
Investment in elementary school 0.038 0.037
Investment in college 0.121 0.120
Fraction of workers enrolling in college 0.588 0.590
Fraction failing college 0.400 0.399
Intergenerational earnings elasticity 0.470 0.470
Mean assets of people ages 25-29 0.092 0.092
Mean assets of people ages 50-54 0.525 0.525
Death Probabilities and Social Security
I assume that all retirees receive the same constant Social Security beneﬁt. I obtain
the average beneﬁt for males from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social
Security Bulletin (1999-2005). I obtain the probability that a retiree will survive to
the next period from the National Center for Health Statistics (1991-2001).
Estimation Method
Eleven model parameters are calibrated using an exactly identiﬁed simulated method
of moments approach. I minimize the squared percentage deviation of simulated
model statistics from the eleven data moments in Table 4. Let Σ = {γ0,h0,ψ0,ψ1,σu
,θ,σν,Ω,α,χ,δ} and let g(Σ) = (g1
￿
Σ),...,g11(Σ)
￿0 denote the vector where gi(Σ) =
¯ mi−ˆ mi(Σ)
¯ mi is the percentage diﬀerence between empirical moments and simulated mo-
ments. Then:




Table 3 summarizes the estimated parameter values. As can be seen from Table 4,
I get close to matching all of the moments exactly.9 Because ﬁve of the empirical
9The reason that the match is not exact is that the objective function which I minimize is not
continuous. Following Tauchen (1986), I approximate the processes for the shocks to ability and
productivity as ﬁnite state Markov processes. It turns out that the combination of ability and
productivity shock has a non-negligible impact on the college decision. When the parameters are
31moments have unknown variance, it is not possible to compute any standard errors
in this exercise.
6 Decomposing Earnings Persistence in the Model
There are four main model elements that govern earnings persistence: the process by
which abilities are inherited from parents to children, the variance of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, inter vivos transfers from parents to children, and investments
in human capital. Human capital investments are made by parents (individuals in
college) and the government. Parental/individual investments and inter vivos trans-
fers will be aﬀected by the size of the government investments, returns to human
capital investments, taxation, and borrowing constraints. To quantify how the dif-
ferent model elements aﬀect earnings persistence, I shut them down one by one; see
Table 5. We cannot set human capital investments to zero because everyone would
get a zero wage, so we will keep government investments constant, relative to average
earnings in the economy, and set parental investments to zero, inter vivos transfers
to zero, the correlation of abilities to zero, and the variance of the idiosyncratic shock
to zero. I keep the variance of the shocks to the log of abilities, σν, constant in this
exercise.
The main conclusion from Table 5 is that both parental/individual investments
and the correlation of abilities make signiﬁcant positive contributions to intergen-
erational earnings persistence. The link between earnings persistence and private
human capital investments comes from the fact that the optimal parental/individual
human capital investment policy functions are usually upward sloping in ﬁnancial
resources; the exception is for very wealthy individuals.10
changed, almost everyone with the same combination of ability and productivity shock may change
their college decision at the same time. As I increase the number of ability and shock states, the
objective function becomes smoother and the estimation ﬁt improves; however, the computational
time also increases.
10Figure 4 displays an example investment policy function for a model college student. In the
32Table 5: Earnings Persistence with Diﬀerent Model Elements Present
Earnings Correlated Idiosyncratic Private Inter vivos
persistence abilities shocks investments transfers
0.470 X X X X
0.215 X X X
0.544 X X X
0.180 X X X












The case when all model elements are present except private investments in hu-
man capital is particularly interesting. The intergenerational earnings elasticity is
then 0.18, or about the same as in the Scandinavian countries. One way to in-
terpret this is as if private investments in human capital accounts for 62% of the
estimated intergenerational earnings persistence in the US. In the context of the
present model, we would need policy reforms that completely eliminate all private
human capital investments to reach the same earnings persistence as in Scandinavia.
This may imply that factors other than just policy impact cross-country diﬀerences
in earnings persistence. Some of these factors may be captured by the correlation of
abilities/family endowments. However, one shortcoming of the present model is that
there is no explicit modeling of the supply of educational service. It may be realistic
to assume that the human capital production function would change as the demand
for education changes, and that this would impact the results.
simulated model, almost all individuals would be on the upward sloping part of the graph.
33When all model elements are present, the eﬀect of leaving out inter vivos transfers
is to reduce the intergenerational earnings elasticity from 0.47 to 0.428. Inter vivos
transfers aﬀect intergenerational earnings persistence in three ways. The absence of
transfers limits the ability of children with rich parents to invest in college education,
and this would negatively impact earnings persistence. Another eﬀect is that if there
are no inter vivos transfers, the only way a wealthy parent can help the child is
to invest more in human capital. This will increase earnings persistence, as the
diﬀerence between how much is invested in rich and poor children increases. However,
introducing inter vivos transfers alone in the model yields a negative intergenerational
earnings elasticity. This is because of the negative income eﬀect on labor supply.
Children of high earners get larger transfers and work less, which causes a negative
correlation between the earnings of parents and children.
With all elements present in the model, removing the idiosyncratic shocks causes
the intergenerational earnings elasticity to increase from 0.47 to 0.544. The eﬀect of
introducing idiosyncratic wage shocks in the model is generally to reduce earnings
persistence. This is because the shocks are random and not correlated across genera-
tions, like abilities and investments in human capital. However, there is an exception
when only inter vivos transfers are present in the model. Introducing shocks that are
log-normally distributed around zero has the eﬀect of making the society richer and
causing parents to give larger transfers. In the case with only inter vivos transfers
present, larger transfers lead to a stronger negative correlation between the earnings
of parents and children.
The intergenerational earnings elasticity falls to approximately zero when all four
model elements are left out. The reason it is not exactly zero is that I approximate the
continuous AR(1)-process for abilities by ﬁnite state Markov processes, as proposed
by Tauchen (1986), when simulating the model.11 This leads to slight inaccuracies,
11See Appendix 9.4 for details on computation.
34which become smaller as one increases the number of states. Introducing correlated
abilities leads to an intergenerational earnings elasticity of 0.314. One might have
expected it to be equal to the correlation of the log of abilities, 0.332, but there is
a nonlinear relationship between ability and earnings. Having parental/individual
investments alone in the model gives an earnings elasticity of 0.256.
7 Evaluating the Importance of Policies for Earn-
ings Persistence
In Section 2, I documented a strong cross-country correlation between intergenera-
tional earnings persistence and tax progressivity and intergenerational earnings per-
sistence and public spending on tertiary education. This motivates the study, in this
section, of the impact of country policies on earnings persistence. I also study the
impact of relaxing and tightening the borrowing constraints. For country policies, I
ﬁrst use Denmark as a case study because out of the countries in Table 1, Denmark
has the highest and most progressive taxes and they spend the most on tertiary ed-
ucation (see Figures 1 and 2). Denmark is also the country with the lowest earnings
persistence. Results for more countries are presented in Subsection 7.1.
When I perform the policy experiments, I keep public education expenditure and
taxes as functions of average earnings in the economy. In this way if the society
becomes richer or poorer because of a policy change, education expenditure and
taxes will adjust accordingly. Since there is no public good in the model, I do not
keep a balanced government budget and excess tax revenues are assumed to ﬁnance
bureaucracy.12
12In Appendix 9.6, I relax this assumption in the sense that when I perform the policy exper-
iments I redistribute the net change in tax revenues relative to the benchmark model evenly to
all households. Redistribution does not have a large impact on the results with respect to inter-
generational earnings persistence. It does, however, have a signiﬁcant impact on labor supply and
therefore on average earnings.
35The Impact of Taxation and Public Education Expenditure
Table 6 displays how selected model statistics change with the introduction of Danish
policies. As can be seen from row 4 of the Table, the greatest reduction in intergener-
ational earnings persistence comes from introducing a Danish tax system in the US.
Introducing a Danish tax system in the US reduces the intergenerational earnings
elasticity by 12 percentage points, to 0.35, or about 38% of the diﬀerence between
the US and Denmark; see Table 1. The higher and more progressive taxes greatly
reduce the incentives for private investment in education, and this leads to lower
earnings persistence. We observe that higher and more progressive taxes also lead to
lower college enrollment and less cross-sectional inequality. A higher tax level has the
eﬀect of reducing the levels of private investments and private investments’ share of
total investments falls. Thus for a given percentage increase in private investments,
the percentage increase in total investments is smaller. This weakens the relationship
between the parent’s ﬁnancial resources and the child’s earnings and leads to lower
earnings persistence. The eﬀect of more progressive taxes is to disproportionally
reduce the incentives for human capital investments for wealthy and/or high-ability
individuals. This compresses the distribution of private human capital investments
and leads to lower intergenerational earnings persistence.
To investigate the quantitative impact of tax progressivity versus tax levels on
earnings persistence, I impose a tax system with the same average labor income tax
rate as in the US but with the same progressivity as in Denmark, as measured by
2.13 The right column of Table 6 displays the results from this experiment. The
intergenerational persistence of earnings is now 0.423. We can interpret this as if
about 40% of the diﬀerence in earnings persistence between the benchmark economy
and the economy with a Danish tax system is due to increased tax progressivity
and about 60% is due to the increased tax level. We observe that the percentage
13See Appendix 9.5 for details.
36Table 6: Policy Experiments
Statistic Bench- Danish Danish Danish Tax w.
mark taxes educ. subsidies US level,
subsidies + taxes Dan. prg.
Average hours worked 0.417 0.446 0.408 0.440 0.413
Std. dev. of log wages 0.571 0.499 0.632 0.550 0.520
Fraction enrolling in college 0.590 0.511 0.890 0.832 0.507
Intergen. earnings elasticity 0.470 0.350 0.434 0.351 0.423
Average human capital inv. age 5-9 $3998 $868 $5710 $1547 $2287
Average human capital inv. age 10-14 $5127 $1310 $7165 $2144 $3002
Average human capital inv. age 14-19 $5752 $1492 $5055 $864 $3337
Average human capital inv. in college $14692 $1780 $13513 $1881 $6070
Average human capital inv. (all ages) $5016 $1041 $6200 $1288 $2596
Average gift from parent to child $78714 $10333 $128269 $21193 $26581
tax per worker − educ. expenditure
benchmark average earnings 0.343 0.546 0.379 0.599 0.318
Average Earnings $61111 $53489 $71474 $60883 $53539
¯ Iprivate











0.1939 0.1367 0.1572 0.1412 0.1705
Column 2 displays the results when introducing a Danish tax system into the model. Column 3 shows
the resultswhen introducing Danish public education expenditure policies. Column 4 shows the results
when introducing Danish taxes and education spending at the same time. Column 5 displays the results
from introducing a tax system with the US average tax rate but with Danish progressivity. The dollar
amounts are in annual 2005 dollars.
variation in private human capital investments is the same in the experiment with
Danish taxes and in the experiment with US tax levels and Danish tax progressivity.
The diﬀerence in earnings persistence between the two experiments is due to the
level of private investments relative to public investments.
Introducing a Danish public education expenditure scheme lowers the intergen-
erational earnings elasticity by 3.6 percentage points, to 0.434. This is explained by
increased public expenditure reducing the incentives for parental/individual expen-
diture on education in relative terms. Total private education expenditure actually
increases in absolute terms but this is because the society has became richer, and av-
erage earnings have increased by about 17%. Private education expenditure’s share
of total education expenditure does, however, fall from 53% to 42%.
Secondary and tertiary private education spending decreases with Danish pub-
lic expenditure, while private spending on elementary education increases. This is
37Table 7: Public Education Expenditure Per Student as % of GDP Per Capita




Based on data from UNESCO (1999-2005) and OECD (1999-2005)
because the Danish public investments are very large for tertiary and secondary
education (see Table 7) and at about the same level as in the US for elementary
education. Therefore, parents move their investments from late to early education.
Not surprisingly, greatly increasing public expenditure in tertiary education increases
college enrollment. The correlation between college completion and parental earnings
decreases.
Introducing both Danish public education expenditure and taxation at the same
time actually increases earnings persistence by 0.01 percentage point, to 0.351, rel-
ative to the case with just a Danish tax. There are several competing eﬀects here.
On the one hand, private investment in education has become smaller relative to
public investment and this should lead to lower earnings persistence, all else being
equal. On the other hand, we observe that there has been an increase in the percent-
age variation in private investments in education. When public education spending
increases, more people go to college and the private investment pattern changes.
Another eﬀect pointing in the direction of higher earnings persistence is that the
society has become richer, and therefore, people invest more in human capital, in
addition to the government investing more. When total human capital investments
increase, human capital becomes more important for the log of earnings relative to
the idiosyncratic shocks.
It is interesting to note that in the experiment with Danish taxes and public edu-
cation expenditure, average earnings are approximately the same as in the benchmark
economy, as public human capital investments have taken on the role of private in-
38vestments. The average gift from parent to child does, however, drop from $78,714
in the benchmark model to $21,193 in the model with Danish taxes and public edu-
cation expenditure. A large part of the incentives to give the child a transfer lies in
the increased earnings from investment in college. When the incentives for investing
in college are reduced, the transfers from parents to children are also reduced.
We conclude that Danish tax- and education expenditure policies signiﬁcantly
impact earnings persistence. Taxation is quantitatively most important. Whether
having low earnings persistence in the society is good or bad is naturally a diﬀerent
question. Higher and more progressive taxation as a stand-alone policy reduces
human capital accumulation and leads to a poorer society, while increased public
education expenditure has the opposite eﬀect. Higher taxes may, however, be needed
to ﬁnance education expenditure. When I introduced Danish education spending,
the net change in tax revenues was actually positive. However, the society became
richer, and the government only increased its spending on education. I did, for
instance, let the Social Security payments stay at their old level. Yet another issue
is, of course, general equilibrium eﬀects. I will leave the study of optimal policies to
future research.
The Impact of Borrowing Constraints
The importance of borrowing constraints both for intergenerational earnings persis-
tence and college enrollment has received much attention in the literature. In this
section, I study the eﬀect of tightening and relaxing the college borrowing constraint,
as well as relaxing the assumption that borrowing is allowed only if one attends col-
lege. Finally, I allow for negative inter vivos transfers; that is, the parents can pass
on debt to their children. Table 8 displays the results from these experiments.
As can be seen from Table 8, relatively large changes to the borrowing constraint
have relatively little impact on intergenerational earnings persistence. Completely
eliminating borrowing for college reduces college enrollment by 18% and college com-
39Table 8: The Impact of Borrowing Constraints
Statistic Bench- 0X BC 2X BC 2X BC w. Negative
mark o. college transfers
Fraction enrolling in college 0.590 0.483 0.619 0.611 0.418
Fraction completing college 0.355 0.306 0.371 0.368 0.262
Intergen. earnings elasticity 0.470 0.474 0.466 0.468 0.472
Average human capital inv. in college $14692 $14914 $16874 $16715 $17819
Average gift from parent to child $78714 $77168 $86709 $84367 $31390
Average Earnings $61111 $60068 $63143 $62916 $60962
Columns 2 and 3 display the results when setting the college borrowing constraint to 0 and doubling
the college borrowing constraint, to $49,712. The college borrowing constraint is linearly decreasing
between college and retirement. Column 4 displays the results when people that do not attend college
are also allowed to borrow up to twice the original college borrowing constraint, or $49,712, in all time
periods before retirement. Column 5 displays the results when the borrowing constraint is 2 times the
original college borrowing constraint in all time periods prior to retirement and parents are allowed to
pass on debt to their children.
pletion by 14%; however, it is those who have the least to gain from college who drop
out. Average earnings in the economy fall only by 1.7%, and intergenerational earn-
ings persistence rises only by 0.4 percentage point. Letting people borrow more has
little impact both on earnings persistence and on college enrollment. Human capital
investments in college increase slightly and average earnings increase slightly when
more borrowing is allowed. The obvious reason that relaxing the borrowing con-
straint has little eﬀect on earnings persistence is simply that most individuals are
not borrowing constrained from investing in human capital. Most individuals begin
to accumulate positive asset holdings at a young age to save for retirement and for
their children’s college education. Thus, there are no binding constraints stopping
them from investing more in human capital. It does, however, turn out that in the
benchmark economy, the college borrowing constraint binds for about 30% of those
who complete college. However, because it is also possible to work in college, tight-
ening the borrowing constraint will not necessarily lead to large changes in human
capital investments. Individuals in college can compensate by working more.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 8 display the results from experiments in which every-
one, not just those who attend college, can borrow up to twice the original college
40borrowing constraint in all time periods prior to retirement. In column 5, parents are
also allowed to give their children negative inter vivos transfers. Allowing for bor-
rowing against children’s earnings leads to a very slight increase in intergenerational
earnings elasticity, from 0.468 to 0.472, relative to the experiment in column 4 with
identical borrowing constraints for parents but only positive transfers to children
allowed. Allowing parents to pass on debt to their children is bad for children with
poor parents. Many parents choose to borrow toward their children’s earnings. The
loan is not used for human capital investments but is rather added to the parents’
retirement savings. This leads to a society in which the average holdings of capital
are lower and the average transfer from parent to child falls by about $53,000 rela-
tive to the experiment in column 4 with identical borrowing constraints for parents
but only positive transfers to children allowed. There is a signiﬁcant drop in college
enrollment; however, average earnings decrease only slightly. It is those who would
get marginal gains from college who drop out, and those who have large gains from
college are able to invest almost the same amount as before. The average human
capital investment in college actually increases, but this is because college completion
is lower and those who drop out were investing little.
7.1 Earnings Persistence and Policies Across Countries
Above, I looked closely at the eﬀect of introducing Danish tax- and education expen-
diture policies into the US on earnings persistence. In this section I present similar
results for all the countries for which I have the data, see Table 9. Unfortunately,
public education expenditure at all 3 levels of education is only available for 8 of the
11 countries in Table 1.
Column 3 in Table 9 displays the simulated earnings persistence in the model after
introducing the ﬁtted tax policy from each country in Table 1 into the US. Column
4 displays the fraction of the diﬀerence between the actual earnings persistence in
41Figure 5: The Impact of Taxation on Intergenerational Earnings Persistence
On average introducing a tax system from country i in the US accounts for 25% of
the diﬀerence in intergenerational earnings persistence between the US and country i.
Corr(actual, model)=0.68.
the US and each country that is explained by introducing the tax policy from that
country into the US. Tax policies on average explain 25% of the diﬀerence between
the US and country i. In Figure 5 I plot the simulated earnings persistence in the
model after introducing the tax policy from each country into the US against the
earnings persistence for each country in the data. The correlation between actual
and simulated earnings persistence is 0.68. If we had been able to explain 100% of
the diﬀerence between the US and each country with taxes, all the dots in Figure 5
should have been on the diagonal.
The results from introducing the public education expenditure policies from each
country, where data is available, into the US are displayed in column 5 of Table 9. On
average education expenditure explains 35% of the diﬀerence between country i and
the US. However, education expenditure does a good job of explaining the diﬀerence
between the US and the countries where earnings persistence in the data is not that
diﬀerent from in the US (UK, Italy, France, Spain) but it cannot explain the large












US 0.47 0.470 - 0.470 - 0.470 -
Denmark 0.15 0.350 37.50 0.434 11.25 0.351 37.19
Norway 0.17 0.419 17.00 0.460 3.33 0.434 12.00
Finland 0.18 0.397 25.17 0.467 1.03 0.428 14.48
Canada 0.19 0.466 1.43 . . . .
Sweden 0.27 0.409 30.50 . . . .
Germany 0.32 0.381 59.33 . . . .
Spain 0.40 0.477 -10.00 0.425 64.29 0.433 52.86
France 0.41 0.457 21.67 0.429 68.33 0.409 98.33
Italy 0.43 0.449 52.50 0.417 67.50 0.382 -20.00
UK 0.50 0.473 10.00 0.478 26.67 0.474 13.33
Average 0.317 0.432 24.51 0.448 34.63 0.423 29.74
The table displays the impact on earnings persistence from introducing the tax- and education
expenditure policies from each country into the US.
diﬀerences between the US and the Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Finland).
It should be noted in this context that the quantitative impact of public expenditure
on early education is greater than the impact of expenditure on college education14.
The Nordic countries have very high public spending on tertiary education while
relatively moderate spending on early education15.
Column 7 in Table 9 displays the results from at the same time introducing both
the tax- and public education expenditure policies from each country into the US. On
average this explains 30% of the diﬀerence between the US and country i. Relative to
just introducing the education expenditure policy from each country into the US, we
now do a little better in explaining the Nordic countries, where earnings persistence
is signiﬁcantly lower than in the US, but we do worse in explaining the diﬀerence
between the US an some of the other countries.
14A similar result is found in Restuccia and Urrutia (2004)
15This is dependent on making the same assumption for these countries as I did for the US,
namely to count public education expenditure raised by local taxes as private spending.
438 Conclusion
In this paper I develop an intergenerational life-cycle model of human capital accu-
mulation and earnings, which features taxation, public education expenditure, bor-
rowing constraints, partially inheritable abilities, inter vivos transfers from parent to
child, and idiosyncratic wage shocks as determinants of intergenerational earnings
persistence. I calibrate the model to US data and use it to decompose the contri-
bution to earnings persistence from diﬀerent model elements and to quantify how
earnings persistence in the US changes as I introduce policies from other countries.
I ﬁnd that individual investments in human capital can account for 62% of the esti-
mated intergenerational earnings elasticity in the US. Taxation and public education
expenditure have a signiﬁcant impact on earnings persistence through their impact
on individual investments in human capital and are signiﬁcant contributors to the
cross-country patterns that empirical researchers have found. Taxation on average
explains 25% of the diﬀerence between the US and 10 other countries while public
education expenditure on average explains 35% of the diﬀerence between the US and
7 other countries. I also ﬁnd that borrowing constraints have a limited impact on
earnings persistence.
Future research in this area may include the study of optimal education expendi-
ture and tax policies within an intergenerational general equilibrium framework. An
extension is also to explicitly model the supply of educational services. In this paper
I have assumed that the technology for human capital production stays the same as
the demand for education changes.
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479 Appendix
9.1 Discussion of Diﬃculties with Comparing Diﬀerent Stud-
ies of Earnings Persistence
There are some diﬃculties related to comparing diﬀerent studies of intergenerational
earnings persistence. Solon (1992) and Blanden (2009) provide more in-depth dis-
cussions of some of the methodological issues. One problem in the estimation of 1 is
the measure of earnings. Ideally the measure of earnings used in 1 should be perma-
nent or lifetime earnings. Since this measure is rarely available, the econometrician
will either use earnings observed in a single year or preferably take the average of
several years of earnings. This will generally be an inaccurate measure of permanent
earnings. It is easy to show that an inaccurate measure of the father’s earnings in
1 will lead the estimate of β to be biased downward. A ﬁrst step toward reducing
this measurement error is controlling for age in 1, and this is done in pretty much
every study. However, if more years of earnings are averaged, the measurement error
is reduced, and this is a source of discrepancies between diﬀerent studies. Another
obvious source of discrepancies between studies is the quality of the data. If the sam-
ple is too homogeneous, i.e., the variance of earnings is too small, as is typical for
unrepresentative data samples, the problem with measurement error is compounded;
see Solon (1992).
A possible solution to the problem with measurement error in the father’s earnings
is the use of instrumental variables. The instruments must be uncorrelated with the
measurement error and, in addition, uncorrelated to the son’s earnings. The problem
with the instrumental variable approach is that most variables related to father’s
earnings may also have an independent impact on the son’s earnings. Solon (1992)
shows that in this case, the estimate of β will be biased upward. The instrumental
variables approach is nonetheless becoming more popular in the literature.
48Finally, the age at which father’s and son’s earnings are observed may have a
substantial impact on the estimates of β; see Haider and Solon (2006) and Grawe
(2003). Controlling for age in the regression does not solve this problem, since high
and low earners have diﬀerent life-cycle earnings proﬁles. Often the earnings of young
sons are regressed on the earnings of old fathers, which is found to cause a downward
bias in the estimate of β. Haider and Solon (2006) ﬁnd that the years around 40 will
be the best proxies for lifetime earnings.
Corak (2006) provides a cross-country meta study of intergenerational earnings
persistence that tries to take into account how many years of the father’s earnings
were used as a measure for permanent earnings, whether an IV approach was used,
and the age of the father at the time of observation. Table 1 displays the results
from this study supplemented with earnings persistence from Italy and Spain, which
I take from Piraino (2007) and Pla (2009). I adjust the number for Italy using a
formula provided in Corak (2006). I cannot do the same for Spain, because I do not
know the average age of the fathers in that study. Given the many problems with
comparing diﬀerent studies of intergenerational earnings persistence, it is clear that
Table 1 should be interpreted as a stylized fact.
9.2 Fitting Tax Functions Based on Data from the OECD
For every country in Table 1, I ﬁt the polynomial in 30. I use this functional form
because it generally gives me a very good ﬁt, R2 above 99.9%, and because I get
functions that are strictly increasing and well behaved on a relatively wide range of
labor income. I use labor income tax data from the OECD tax-beneﬁt calculator16
and the OECD tax database17. These data are constructed by the OECD based on
tax laws from diﬀerent countries.
The OECD tax-beneﬁt calculator gives the gross- and net (after taxes and ben-
16Available at: www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39717906_1_1_1_1,00.html.
17Available at: www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_1,00&&en-USS_01DBC.html.
49Figure 6: Labor Income Tax Functions for the US and Denmark
eﬁts) labor income at every percentage of average labor income on a range between
50% and 200% of average labor income, by year and family type starting in 2001. I
use the data at every ﬁfth percentage point for single individuals without children
and take an average of the years 2001-2005. The OECD tax catabase provides the
top marginal tax rate in each country and the starting point for this tax rate. To get
the tax at earnings above 200% of average labor income, I use this information and
compute the tax at every multiple of 0.5 times average earnings between 2.5 and 15
times average earnings. For most countries the top marginal tax rate kicks in before
200% of average labor income, but in the US, for instance, the top marginal tax rate
starts at about 9 times average earnings. I then assume that the marginal tax rate
increases linearly between 2 times average earnings and the point at which the top
marginal tax rate becomes eﬀective.
Since I only have tax data starting at 50% of average earnings, I add a random
positive point of close to zero tax for close to zero earnings, to get my tax functions
well behaved for very small earnings. This, however, has almost no impact on the
ﬁt with the real data points. The alternative would have have been to require all
50Table 10: Country Tax Functions
Country τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 R2
Denmark -1.242825 3.603493 -2.456365 0.5239973 0.9997
Norway -0.6488133 1.818972 -1.023706 0.1670745 0.9999
Finland -0.71829 1.895892 -1.004558 0.1465101 0.9996
Canada -0.3056732 0.8059581 -0.2546371 -0.0145851 0.9997
Sweden -0.6629891 1.966373 -1.183786 0.2152142 0.9997
Germany -1.329006 4.017692 -2.947534 0.6809511 0.9998
Spain -0.2001187 0.3728243 0.1407691 -0.1200151 0.9994
France -0.5460613 1.651868 -1.011427 0.1903222 0.9998
Italy -0.7060691 1.782236 -0.9431628 0.137171 0.9989
USA -0.5730303 1.705866 -1.096482 0.2207298 0.9998
UK -0.5907906 1.778369 -1.163281 0.2362276 0.9998
people to work enough to make a certain amount of income. I ﬁt the tax functions by
running OLS regressions. Table 10 displays the country tax functions, while Figure
6 plots the tax functions for the US and Denmark.
9.3 Proof of Propositions 3.1 and 3.1
Proposition 3.1
Since log(yt) is a monotonic transformation of yt, it will be suﬃcient to take the
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￿2 > 0 (35)
￿
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￿
9.4 Computational Details
Computation of Optimal Policies
I put boundaries on the capital and human capital space and pick a grid in each
dimension. I pick 40 grid points in K = [kmin,kmax] and 16 grid points in H =
[hmin,hmax]. The grid points for capital are taken to be the scaled zeros of a 40th or-
der Chebyshev polynomial ,while the grid points for human capital are taken to be the
scaled zeros of a 16th order Chebyshev polynomial. Following the method outlined
by Tauchen (1986), I approximate the processes for the idiosyncratic productivity
shock, u, and ability, A, as ﬁnite state Markov processes. I use 7 equally spaced states
for u in U = [−2σu,2σu], and 13 equally spaced states for A in ¯ A = [−3σA,3σA].
Let J = {0,1} be the state space for whether an individual is college educated. The
maximum size of the state space occurs in periods 5-7, or ages 40-50, when there are
6 state variables apart from time. The state space is then J ×K×H×H × ¯ A×U, or
1,863,680 grid points. I compute the household’s optimal policies for each grid point
in each time period by iterating backwards. I start from age 100, the last period
of life. In that period, the next period’s value function is 0, and the optimal policy
52is to consume as much as possible. Knowing the value function at age 100, I can
compute optimal policies and value functions for age 95, and so on. Reaching age
50, when the child leaves home, I need to know both the parent’s value function at
age 55 and the child’s value function at age 20 to compute the optimal policies. The
ﬁrst time around, I use an educated guess for the child’s value function at age 20.
When I reach age 20, I get a new V (age = 20,·) and start over again from age 50. I
continue this iteration until V converges.
To solve for the optimal policies in each time period, I use the routine called
LCONF from the IMSL Fortran library. It is based on M. Powell’s method for solving
linearly constrained optimization problems; see IMSL documentation for details. To
interpolate the value function outside of the grid, I use Chebyshev collocation; see
Judd (1998), Heer and Maussner (2004). When there is a child in the household and
the parent is investing in the child’s human capital, the next period’s value function
must be interpolated in the K × H-space. The value function is then represented
as a polynomial with 40 X 16 = 640 coeﬃcients. At one point in time, when the
agent chooses whether or not to attend college, I am taking the max of two value
functions. When these two value functions overlap, the value function considered by
the parent, before the child makes the college decision, will generally not be concave.
However, what the parent needs to consider is the expectation of the value function
over the idiosyncratic shock. It turns out that the expectation of the value function
is concave, although there is no theoretical guarantee for it. To be absolutely sure
that I am ﬁnding a global max, I am multi starting the solver from points that are
far apart.
Simulation
Knowing today’s state, the policy functions, and drawing shocks, u and ν, I can ﬁnd
the next period’s state. I make 200,000 draws from a random initial distribution of
20 year olds and run the simulation for 200 generations (enough to reach a stationary
53distribution). In the simulation, the policy functions must be interpolated on the
K ×H ×H-space as both the child’s and the parent’s human capital may be outside
of the grid. I use linear interpolation.
Hardware and Software
I use Intel Fortran, version 11.1 and a computer with a 2.93 GHz Core-i7 processor.
To speed up the computation, I use OpenMP to parallelize the code on the 8 threads.
9.5 Introducing a Tax System with US Level and Danish
Progressivity
We want to introduce a new tax function, ˜ τ(y), which has the same average tax rate
as in the US but where progressivity, as deﬁned in 2, is the same as the tax system
in Denmark, τD(y). We must have:
1 −
1 − ˜ τ(y2)





1 − ˜ τ(y2)
1 − τD(y2)
=
1 − ˜ τ(y1)
1 − τD(y1)
(40)
for all levels of y1 and y2. Letting the fraction
1−˜ τ(y)
1−τD(y) be equal to a constant, Λ, for
all levels of y, we can obtain a new tax system with the desired properties as follows:




⇒ ˜ τ(y) = 1 − Λ + ΛτD(y) (41)
We must solve for Λ in the context of the model to obtain the same average tax level
as in the US.
9.6 Policy Experiments With Redistribution of Net Changes
in Tax Revenues
Below I reproduce the ﬁrst 4 columns of Table 6 but this time I redistribute the net
change in tax revenues relative to the benchmark model evenly to all households.
54Table 11: Policy Experiments with Redistribution of ∆ Tax Revenue
Statistic Bench- Danish Danish Danish
mark taxes educ. subsidies
subsidies + taxes
Average hours worked 0.417 0.398 0.403 0.387
Std. dev. of log wages 0.571 0.491 0.628 0.537
Fraction enrolling in college 0.590 0.426 0.889 0.798
Intergen. earnings elasticity 0.470 0.350 0.437 0.354
Average human capital inv. age 5-9 $3998 $666 $5505 $1090
Average human capital inv. age 10-14 $5127 $1009 $6905 $1516
Average human capital inv. age 14-19 $5752 $1110 $4841 $552
Average human capital inv. in college $14692 $1601 $12775 $966
Average human capital inv. (all ages) $5016 $791 $5927 $887
Average gift from parent to child $78714 $5026 $118847 $8587
tax per worker − educ. expenditure
benchmark average earnings 0.343 0.481 0.366 0.510
Average Earnings $61111 $46229 $69597 $50047
¯ Iprivate











0.194 0.156 0.156 0.142
Column 2 displays the results when introducing a Danish tax system into the model.
Column 3 shows the results when introducing Danish public education expenditure policies.
Column 4 shows the results when introducing Danish taxes and education spending at the
same time. The dollar amounts are in annual 2005 dollars.
Redistribution does not have a large impact on the results with respect to intergen-
erational earnings persistence. It does, however, greatly reduce labor supply and
average earnings. The reduction in labor supply is the reason for why redistribution
does not have a larger impact on earnings persistence. On one hand poorer house-
holds get more ﬁnancial resources that could be invested in education but on the
other hand poorer households tend to reduce their labor supply the most in response
to the redistribution. this reduces their incentives to invest in education.
55WORKING PAPERS*  
Editor:  Nils Gottfries    
 
 
2010:18 Adrian Adermon and Che-Yuan Liang, Piracy, Music, and Movies: A 
Natural Experiment. 23 pp. 
 
2010:19 Miia Bask and Mikael Bask, Inequality Generating Processes and 
Measurement of the Matthew Effect. 23 pp. 
 
2010:20 Jonathan Gemus, The Distributional Effects of Direct College Costs. 34 pp. 
 
2010:21 Magnus Gustavsson and Pär Österholm, Does the Labor-Income Process 
Contain a Unit Root? Evidence from Individual-Specific Time Series. 26 pp. 
 
2010:22 Ranjula Bali Swain and Adel Varghese, Being Patient with Microfinance: 
The Impact of Training on Indian Self Help Groups. 32 pp. 
 
2010:23 Ranjula Bali Swain and Maria Floro, Reducing Vulnerability through 
  Microfinance: Evidence from Indian Self Help Group Program. 32 pp. 
 
2010:24 Ranjula Bali Swain and Adel Varghese, Microfinance ‘Plus’: The Impact of 
Business Training on Indian Self Help Groups. 9 pp. 
 
2010:25 Mikael Bask and Anna Widerberg, Measuring the Stability of a Dynamic 
System: The Case of the Stock Market Turmoil 2007-2008.  20 pp. 
 
2010:26 Stefan Eriksson and Jonas Lagerström, The Determinants and Consequences 
of Unemployed Workers’ Wage Demands. 30 pp. 
 
2010:27 Olof Åslund, Per-Anders Edin, Peter Fredriksson and Hans Grönqvist, Peers, 
neighborhoods and immigrant student achievement - evidence from a 
placement policy. 42 pp. 
 
2011:1  Matz Dahlberg, Karin Edmark and Heléne Lundqvist, Ethnic Diversity and 
Preferences for Redistribution. 43 pp. 
 
2011:2  Haishan Yu, The EU ETS and Firm Profits: An Ex-post Analysis for 
Swedish Energy Firms. 19 pp. 
 
2011:3  Edward Palmer, Generic NDC - Equilibrium, Valuation and Risk Sharing 
with and without NDC Bonds. 40 pp. 
 
2011:4  Susanne Ek and Bertil Holmlund, Part-Time Unemployment and Optimal 
Unemployment Insurance. 32 pp. 
 
2011:5  Mikael Elinder, Oscar Erixson and Henry Ohlsson, Carnegie visits Nobel: 
Do inheritances affect labor and capital income? 34 pp. 
 
                                                 
*  A list of papers in this series from earlier years will be sent on request by the department. 2011:6  Jan Södersten and Tobias Lindhe, The Norwegian Shareholder Tax 
Reconsidered. 23 pp. 
 
2011:7  Jesper Roine and Daniel Waldenström, On the Role of Capital Gains in 
Swedish Income Inequality. 29 pp. 
 
2011:8  Niklas Bengtsson and Per Engström, Control and Efficiency in the Nonprofit 
Sector Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment. 24 pp. 
 
2011:9  Ranjula Bali Swain and Adel Varghese, Delivery Mechanisms and Impact of 
Training through Microfinance. 20 pp. 
 
2011:10 Matz Dahlberg, Eva Mörk and Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, Do Politicians’ 
Preferences Matter for Voters’ Voting Decisions? 28 pp. 
 
2011:11 Jonas Kolsrud, Consumption Smoothing during Unemployment. 45 pp. 
 
2011:12 Mikael Bask and João Madeira, The Increased Importance of Asset Price 
Misalignments for Business Cycle Dynamics. 32 pp. 
 
2011:13 Katarina Nordblom and Jovan Zamac, Endogenous Norm Formation Over 
the LifeCycle – The Case of Tax Evasion. 30 pp. 
 
2011:14 Jan Pettersson, Instead of Bowling Alone? Unretirement of Old-Age 
Pensioners. 41 pp. 
 
2011:15 Adrian Adermon and Magnus Gustavsson, Job Polarization and Task-Biased 
Technological Change: Sweden, 1975–2005. 33 pp. 
 
2011:16 Mikael Bask, A Case for Interest Rate Inertia in Monetary Policy. 33 pp. 
 
2011:17 Per Engström, Katarina Nordblom, Annika Persson and Henry Ohlsson, Loss 
evasion and tax aversion. 43 pp. 
 
2011:18 Mikael Lindahl, Mårten Palme, Sofia Sandgren Massih and Anna Sjögren, 
Transmission of Human Capital across Four Generations: Intergenerational 
Correlations and a Test of the Becker-Tomes Model. 27 pp. 
 
2011:19 Stefan Eriksson and Karolina Stadin, The Determinants of Hiring in Local 
Labor Markets: The Role of Demand and Supply Factors. 33 pp. 
 
2011:20 Krzysztof Karbownik and Michał Myck, Mommies’ Girls Get Dresses, 
Daddies’ Boys Get Toys. Gender Preferences in Poland and their 
Implications. 49 pp. 
 
2011:21 Hans A Holter, Accounting for Cross-Country Differences in 
Intergenerational Earnings Persistence: The Impact of Taxation and Public 
Education Expenditure. 56 pp. 
 
 
See also working papers published by the Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation 
http://www.ifau.se/                ISSN  1653-6975 